The Blob & The Barbarian: Our Imperfect, Remarkable Nature

I first heard the phrase recently in Deirdre McCloskey’s Why Liberalism Works, which I am reading for a book club Pete Boettke curates under the name No Due Date. McCloskey is quoting the economist Donald Boudreaux, who observed that a great many people believe human beings, left undirected by a sovereign power, can be only one of two things. Either we are “inert blobs, capable of achieving nothing,” or we are “unintelligent and brutal barbarians destined only to rob, rape, plunder, and kill each other until and unless a sovereign power restrains us and directs our energies onto more productive avenues.”

I laughed at the first half and winced at the second, which is roughly the response the sentence was written to produce. Then I kept thinking about the blob. It is a wonderful word for a grotesque idea. A blob has no shape of its own. It lies where it is put. It wants nothing, and so it cannot be frustrated, and so nothing done to it can count as an injury. If people are blobs, governing them is a branch of pottery.

In a book with Art Carden, McCloskey adds brackets assigning the two halves to their political owners. The blobs go to the Democrats and Labour, the barbarians to the Republicans and Tories. The left thinks people need a shaper, the right thinks they need a cage, and each side has its own anthropology and its preferred sort of man at the controls.

The tidiness misleads. The blob and the barbarian are one picture drawn in two moods. Both hold that whatever is good in human affairs comes from above, and that the people below are raw material: inert in one telling, explosive in the other, and in neither telling the source of anything worth having. One view sees no motion; the other sees only the wrong kind. Both conclude that someone must hold the controls, and they quarrel over his reasons and his manners.

There is a more interesting question beneath the quarrel. What kind of creatures are we, and what sort of political institutions are appropriate to us? The answer must account for our remarkable capacity to create knowledge and cooperate with strangers, along with our equally remarkable talent for making mistakes and mistreating one another. A political philosophy that overlooks either part will eventually discover the omission, usually at someone else’s expense.

The blob has the longer pedigree among the well-meaning. Adam Smith met its keeper and described him in a passage added to The Theory of Moral Sentiments for its sixth edition, in 1790, the year he died. The “man of system,” Smith wrote, “seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members of a great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chess-board.” What the planner overlooks is that, unlike the pieces on his board, every member of society possesses “a principle of motion of its own,” which may differ considerably from the motion the legislature would prefer.

The chess piece is the blob with better posture. It stands where it is placed, and its whole career is the will of the hand above it. Smith’s reply was that the pieces move. They have purposes of their own, and those purposes do not wait to be consulted. Where the hand and the pieces happen to agree, he observed, the game goes easily. Where they conflict, it goes miserably. Smith was a commissioner of customs when he wrote this, and so had a professional acquaintance with the pieces’ principle of motion. Much of it was called smuggling.

The barbarian has a grander pedigree and a better excuse. Thomas Hobbes published Leviathan in 1651, two years after the English had cut off their king’s head. The civil wars had furnished him with abundant evidence of what men could do to one another when political authority collapsed. His description of life without a common power, a war “of every man against every man” in which life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short,” has outlived nearly every argument made against it. History gives us ample reason to take him seriously.

I want to treat Hobbes fairly, because his half of the picture carries the strongest objection to the liberal argument. The Hobbesian grants that people are full of motion and says that this is precisely the trouble. Spontaneous order is a pleasant phrase, he says, but it grows only inside a fence. Markets require contracts, contracts require courts, courts require enforcement, and at the end of the chain stands someone with the authority to compel obedience. The liberal who praises the self-organizing crowd is admiring a garden and forgetting the wall.

There is force in the objection. The peaceful cooperation of strangers depends upon rules, expectations, and a reasonable assurance that agreements will be honored. A society in which anyone may seize his neighbor’s property or settle a disagreement with a club will have little opportunity to develop the arts of commerce. Hobbes understood that fear can destroy the conditions for ordinary life, and his argument deserves better than the cheerful assurance that everyone will somehow get along.

Yet the necessity of rules tells us remarkably little about their proper origin, their content, or the extent of the authority required to enforce them. Much of the law governing commerce emerged through the accumulated practices of people who needed to settle disputes and continue doing business. Merchants developed customs, courts refined principles through particular cases, and arrangements that proved useful survived because people had reason to use them. Government played important roles in this history, including enforcement, but the process was never reducible to commands issued from a single center.

Hayek later distinguished law that grows from human interaction from legislation deliberately enacted by political authority. The distinction matters because the knowledge embedded in a useful rule may be far greater than the knowledge possessed by anyone who applies it. Generations of experience can be condensed into a practice whose advantages no participant fully understands. Such rules can be unjust or mistaken, of course, and they require criticism like anything else. Their historical emergence gives them no immunity from reform. But it does suggest that a sovereign may inherit an order he could never have designed.

A sword can protect a rule, but it is a poor instrument for discovering one.

Even if we grant the Hobbesian his sovereign, however, another difficulty remains. If people are dangerous creatures, what are we to make of the man entrusted with their protection? He has the same appetites, fears, vanities, and capacity for violence, now furnished with an army. Locke saw the problem clearly. To accept an unlimited ruler as protection against one’s neighbors, he wrote, was rather like taking care to avoid the mischief of “pole-cats, or foxes,” while being content to be “devoured by lions.”

The blob theory makes the same exemption from the other direction. If ordinary people lack the intelligence or initiative to direct their own affairs, the planner is a curious exception. Somehow he possesses the wisdom they lack, together with sufficient knowledge of their purposes and circumstances to arrange them correctly. He is the one blob with a principle of motion, and the one who decides where the others go.

There is enough truth in both pictures to make them dangerous. We are sometimes blobs, content to let another man do our thinking, and sometimes barbarians, quite prepared to take what we want at another’s expense. I have been both, though I hope neither has become a permanent occupation. Hobbes was right to worry about what men might do to one another, and the paternalist is right that people sometimes make a terrible mess of their own affairs. The trouble begins when these observations are promoted into a theory of mankind, and still more when they become a license for one imperfect man to govern the rest.

The difficulty is older than either caricature. Plato devoted much of the Republic to the question of who ought to govern, and answered that the task belonged to those sufficiently wise to understand the good. The philosopher-king has enjoyed a long and distinguished career under other names. The wise have been succeeded by the virtuous, the hereditary, the revolutionary, the scientifically trained, and the democratically chosen, each advancing some claim to legitimate authority. The question remains attractive because it promises that good government may be secured by finding the right sort of person to exercise power.

Karl Popper thought the question itself was mistaken.

Writing The Open Society and Its Enemies in New Zealand during the Second World War, while Europe was being devastated by rulers who claimed an unusually intimate knowledge of history’s proper direction, Popper proposed a different starting point. Instead of asking who should rule, he asked how political institutions might be arranged to prevent bad or incompetent rulers from doing too much damage.

At first glance this seems a modest improvement, a procedural concern better suited to constitutional lawyers than philosophers. In fact, it changes the conception of humanity upon which political institutions are built. Popper’s question assumes that rulers will often be bad, which is to say that they will be people. It asks how their mistakes can be exposed, their power limited, and their offices taken away without bloodshed. It leaves no one standing outside the picture.

The importance of this change becomes clearer when we turn to Popper’s philosophy of knowledge. Human understanding grows through conjecture and criticism. We propose explanations, discover their errors, and attempt better ones. The process offers no final assurance that our present understanding is correct, and no person or institution possesses an exemption from the possibility of error. The most accomplished scientist remains answerable to evidence, just as the most confident political reformer ought to remain answerable to those who must live with his reforms.

This is a peculiar foundation for optimism, especially in a century inclined to equate optimism with confidence. Popper begins with our ignorance. We know astonishingly little, and much of what we think we know will eventually prove mistaken. But the acknowledgment of ignorance opens the possibility of improvement, provided criticism remains possible and the consequences of error can be contained.

A society that permits criticism, experimentation, and peaceful correction can learn from mistakes without requiring everyone to make the same mistake at once. Competing ideas can be tested against experience. Failed arrangements can be abandoned. Authority can be challenged without treating every challenge as a threat to civilization itself. An open society is valuable partly because its institutions recognize that nobody can be trusted to get everything right.

There is another reason no one can be trusted to get everything right, even when his intentions are good and his judgment sound. Knowledge itself is dispersed. Hayek developed this point in “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” published in 1945, observing that much of the knowledge upon which economic decisions depend concerns the particular circumstances of time and place. It belongs to people who know their customers, their materials, their opportunities, and their problems, often in ways that cannot be fully articulated, much less assembled into a plan for an entire society.

The difficulty grows with the complexity of the order being governed. Every decision changes the circumstances facing countless others, who respond in ways no authority could entirely anticipate. Knowledge must continually be discovered and revised. People learn what is possible by attempting things, and learn what is wanted by offering them to others who remain free to refuse.

I explored this in an earlier essay, I, Chip, which follows the extraordinary network of knowledge and cooperation required to produce an ordinary computer chip. The people who mine its raw materials, refine its chemicals, manufacture its equipment, and design its circuitry possess only fragments of the knowledge required for the finished product. Their work is coordinated through institutions and signals that allow them to pursue different purposes while contributing to an achievement none could accomplish alone. No single mind knows how to make the whole thing.

The greater wonder is that the knowledge required to make such a thing did not exist before people began discovering it. These institutions permit more than the efficient use of what is already known. They make possible the creation of knowledge that no planner could have included in his original design.

A political order that presumes to know in advance which activities are useful, which experiments will succeed, and which purposes are worth pursuing must eventually frustrate discoveries upon which its future prosperity depends. Even the most benevolent authority cannot direct people toward opportunities that nobody has yet imagined.

None of this means that every private decision will be wise or that voluntary arrangements automatically produce justice. People make bad investments, trust scoundrels, neglect their responsibilities, and cling to explanations long after experience has exposed their weaknesses. A useful political order must account for these failures, including the injuries people can inflict upon those who have no opportunity to consent. The case for liberty is strengthened by acknowledging these difficulties. It is precisely because our knowledge is imperfect and our motives mixed that power must be constrained, criticism protected, and people allowed to seek better answers.

Yet our fallibility is only half the story. David Deutsch, the Oxford physicist and one of Popper’s most ambitious intellectual heirs, carries the argument further. In The Beginning of Infinity, he asks us to consider what is distinctive about human beings in a universe otherwise governed by impersonal physical laws. His answer is our capacity to create explanations.

A rock moves when something pushes it. A plant grows according to biological processes it cannot understand or alter by choice. Human beings can discover why the rock moves, invent a machine to move it differently, and develop an explanation that allows someone a thousand years later to build a better machine still. The capacity to generate explanatory knowledge permits us to transform our circumstances in ways that cannot be inferred from the immediate properties of our bodies or the materials around us.

Deutsch calls people universal explainers. The phrase carries an extraordinary claim: human beings can, in principle, develop explanations of any phenomenon that is explicable, though no particular person can be expected to succeed and no explanation comes with a guarantee against error. Knowledge remains conjectural, and its growth depends upon criticism. Human creativity supplies possibilities that ignorance alone could never reveal.

Deutsch offers two propositions that belong together: problems are inevitable, and problems are soluble. The first acknowledges that our knowledge will always remain incomplete. The second expresses the possibility of creating the knowledge needed to overcome particular difficulties. It promises no easy victory and no final condition in which every problem has disappeared. The future remains open because there will always be more to understand.

If people are capable of creating new knowledge, their purposes and abilities cannot be adequately represented by any fixed inventory of human needs or talents. What they may accomplish tomorrow depends partly on discoveries that do not yet exist. Institutions that confine them to the judgment of present authorities therefore impose a limit that those authorities cannot measure.

The evidence is written across the material history of the last two centuries. McCloskey has devoted much of her career to explaining what she calls the Great Enrichment, the extraordinary growth in ordinary living standards that began around 1800 and eventually transformed much of the world. Real income per person in countries that experienced sustained modern growth increased many times over, a change that would have seemed fantastic to earlier generations.

The causes were numerous: scientific advances, capital accumulation, institutional improvements, and innumerable inventions. McCloskey asks us to consider another change, one in the standing of ordinary people who sought to improve their circumstances through enterprise. Merchants, inventors, and manufacturers gradually acquired a dignity previously reserved for more exalted occupations. People who once would have needed permission from a guild, a monarch, or a social superior gained greater freedom to attempt things and persuade others of their value.

The results were seldom what anyone expected. A successful invention opened possibilities for others, who adapted it to purposes its inventor had never entertained. An unsuccessful one taught lessons that could be put to use elsewhere. People borrowed, improved, imitated, criticized, and began again. Prosperity grew out of countless decisions made under conditions of uncertainty, with no mind capable of foreseeing their combined effect.

The Great Enrichment was neither uniform nor uninterrupted, and its gains were often accompanied by serious injustices. But the scale of human improvement ought to make us suspicious of any account that assigns ordinary people a merely passive role in their own history. The very creatures supposedly incapable of directing themselves had learned to feed, clothe, house, and heal one another on a scale unknown to their ancestors.

Why, then, do the blob and barbarian remain so persuasive, even in the face of such achievements?

Part of the answer lies in the attraction of authority. A ruler who imagines his subjects incapable of arranging their own lives acquires a convenient justification for arranging them. But there is also a temptation among the governed. Freedom demands decisions, and decisions invite mistakes. It is sometimes a relief to have another person assume the burden, particularly when the consequences of choosing poorly are frightening or uncertain. The promise of competent direction can be appealing even to people who ordinarily resent being directed.

The barbarian picture draws upon fears that are equally real. Disorder is frightening, and people who have experienced violence or insecurity may reasonably place great value upon the protection of a common authority. The difficulty comes when a legitimate desire for security becomes an argument for powers so extensive that they threaten the very security they were meant to preserve.

These temptations are unlikely to disappear. The inclination to command and the desire to be commanded are persistent features of human society. Every generation will produce people confident that its problems are finally too complex for ordinary freedom, together with others willing to surrender a little independence in exchange for the promise that someone competent has taken charge. The danger grows when the two encounter one another.

Liberal institutions must therefore perform a difficult task. They must protect people against aggression while leaving room for peaceful disagreement, private judgment, and experimentation. They must provide enough stability for cooperation to develop without presuming to determine every form that cooperation will take. They must recognize human weakness without reducing humanity to weakness, and acknowledge our creative powers without expecting wisdom or virtue from everyone who exercises them.

There can be no permanent solution to this problem. Every institution is itself the work of fallible people, capable of deterioration, capture, and abuse. Constitutional restraints can be evaded. Customs can become corrupt. The protection of liberty requires continuing criticism and a willingness to reform arrangements that cease to serve their proper purposes. There is no political design so ingenious that it can relieve future generations of the responsibility to think.

I chose an octopus, drawn in the old Greek manner, as my own mark, because it was the best emblem I knew for dispersed intelligence. Of an octopus’s roughly five hundred million neurons, about two-thirds are distributed through its eight arms. Each arm possesses remarkable capacities for sensation and movement, allowing it to respond to its immediate surroundings without waiting for detailed instructions from the central brain. The brain coordinates the animal’s larger behavior, while much of the intricate work of living is carried out through the arms themselves.

It is among the cleverest animals in the sea, and it has no skeleton at all.

Lift one out of the water and set it on a dock, and you will see a blob. Its body slumps. Its arms spread awkwardly across the boards, and movements that were graceful in the water become clumsy and uncertain. A sovereign looking down might conclude that the creature requires shaping, or, if it reached for his ankle, restraining.

Return it to the sea and its capacities become apparent. It can open shells, manipulate unfamiliar objects, squeeze through narrow passages, and explore its surroundings with an intelligence distributed throughout its body. It is capable of mistakes, aggression, and even the occasional act of apparent mischief. But its extraordinary abilities depend upon an environment in which they can be exercised.

The animal did not change. Its element did.

There is something of the same error in the picture Boudreaux described. It observes people in circumstances that frustrate their initiative, deny them responsibility, or deprive them of opportunities for cooperation, and then treats their diminished capacities as evidence that they require direction. It sees their occasional violence and concludes that only superior force can secure peace. From a sufficient height, the purposes and knowledge of individual people disappear, leaving an undifferentiated mass to be organized or restrained.

The more interesting question is what becomes possible when people are given room to exercise their faculties, protected by rules that apply to governors and governed alike, and permitted to discover through experience what neither they nor anyone else yet knows.

They will still make mistakes. Some will remain idle, some will behave badly, and a few will find inventive ways of combining both tendencies. Freedom makes none of these difficulties disappear. It allows us to confront them without assuming that some favored person already possesses the answers.

The octopus remains an imperfect creature, even in its proper element. It is also a remarkable one.

Leave it in the water. It knows what to do.

James W. Vermillion III

Investment manager by day, philosopher by nature. Exploring timeless wisdom and fresh perspectives on wealth, freedom, and ideas. Reading always.

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